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Abstract—In this paper, we study local information privacy (LIP), and design LIP based mechanisms for statistical aggregation while
protecting users’ privacy without relying on a trusted third party. The notion of context-awareness is incorporated in LIP, which can be
viewed as explicit modeling of the adversary’s background knowledge. It enables the design of privacy-preserving mechanisms
leveraging the prior distribution, which can potentially achieve a better utility-privacy tradeoff than context-free notions such as Local
Differential Privacy (LDP). We present an optimization framework to minimize the mean square error in the data aggregation while
protecting the privacy of each individual user’s input data or a correlated latent variable while satisfying LIP constraints. Then, we study
two different types of applications: (weighted) summation and histogram estimation, and derive the optimal context-aware data
perturbation parameters for each case, based on randomized response type of mechanism. We further compare the utility-privacy
tradeoff between LIP and LDP and theoretically explain why the incorporation of prior knowledge enlarges feasible regions of the
perturbation parameters, which thereby leads to higher utility. We also extend the LIP-based privacy mechanisms to the more general
case when exact prior knowledge is not available. Finally, we validate our analysis by simulations using both synthetic and real-world
data. Results show that our LIP-based privacy mechanism provides better utility-privacy tradeoffs than LDP, and the advantage of LIP
is even more significant when the prior distribution is more skewed.
Index Terms—privacy-preserving data aggregation, local information privacy, information-theoretic privacy
F
1 INTRODUCTION
P RIVACY issues are crucial in this big data era, as users’data are collected both intentionally or unintentionally
by an increasing number of private or public organizations.
Most of the collected data is used for ensuring high quality
of service, but may also put one’s sensitive information
at potential risk. For instance, when someone is rating a
movie, his/her preferences may be leaked; when someone
is searching for a parking spot nearby using a smartphone,
his/her real location is uploaded and prone to leakage.
Besides the cases where collected data itself is sensitive
and causes privacy leakage, non-sensitive data release may
also enable malicious inference on one’s private attributes:
whenever there is a correlation between the collected data
and people’s private latent attribute, directly releasing it
causes privacy leakage. For instance, heartbeat data col-
lected by smartwatch may potentially reveal one’s heart
disease [1]; One can easily infer a target user’s home or work
location by tracking his daily location data [2]; Smart meters
can reveal the activities of people inside a home by tracking
their electricity, gas, or water usage frequently over time
[3]. It is therefore desirable to design privacy-preserving
mechanisms providing privacy guarantees without affecting
data utility.
Traditional privacy notions such as k-anonymity [4] do
not provide rigorous privacy guarantees and are prone to
various attacks. Nowadays, Differential Privacy (DP) [5], [6]
has become the defacto standard for ensuring data privacy
in the database community [7]. The definition of DP assures
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that each user’s data has minimal influence on the output of
statistical queries on a database. In the classical DP setting,
a trusted server is assumed to hold all users’ data and
provide noisy answers to queries. However, organizations
or companies collecting users’ data may not be trustworthy,
and the data storage system may not be secure [8]. As a
result, recently, local privacy protection mechanisms have
gained attention as the local setting allows data aggregation
while protecting each user’s data without relying on a
trusted third party [9].
1.1 Local Privacy Notions
In local privacy-preserving data release, each user perturbs
his or her data locally before uploading it; organizations
that want to take advantage of users’ data then aggregate
over the collected data. The earliest such mechanism is
randomized response [10], which randomly perturbs each
user’s data. However, the original randomized response
does not have formal privacy guarantees. Later, Local Dif-
ferential Privacy (LDP) was proposed as a local variant of
DP that bounds the privacy leakage in the local setting [11].
Many schemes were proposed under the notion of LDP. For
example, [12]–[14], and Google’s RAPPOR [15]. LDP based
data aggregation mechanisms have already been deployed
in the real-world. For example, in June 2016, Apple an-
nounced that it would deploy LDP-based mechanisms to
collect user’s typing data [16]. However, Tang et al. show
that although each user’s perturbation mechanism satisfies
LDP, the privacy budget is too large ( = 43)1 to provide any
useful privacy protection. Wang et al. proposed a variety of
1. The parameters,  ≥ 0, measures the privacy level. A smaller 
corresponds to a higher privacy level.
ar
X
iv
:2
00
1.
02
38
5v
1 
 [c
s.C
R]
  8
 Ja
n 2
02
0
JOURNAL OF LATEX CLASS FILES, VOL. 14, NO. 8, AUGUST 2015 2
LDP protocols for frequency estimation [17] and compared
their performance with Google’s RAPPOR. However, for a
given reasonable privacy budget, these protocols provide
limited utility. Intuitively, compared with the central DP
model, it is more challenging to achieve a good utility-
privacy tradeoff in the local setting. The main reasons are
twofold: (1) LDP requires introducing noise at a significantly
higher level than what is required in the central setting. That
is, a lower bound of noise magnitude of Ω(
√
N) is required
for LDP, where N is the number of users. In contrast,
only O(1) is required for central DP [18]. (2) LDP does
not assume a neighborhood constraint on input data, thus
when the data domain is large, LDP leads to a significantly
reduced utility [19].
In general, both local and central DP provide strong
context-free theoretical guarantees against worst-case adver-
saries [20]. Context-free means the adversary can possess
arbitrary background knowledge of a user’s data (except
her specific input instance). In other words, the definition of
(L)DP is too strong and regardless of scenarios where par-
ticular context or prior knowledge of the data is available.
Such scenarios exist for many applications, for instance,
in Internet of Things (IoT), distribution of context related
to sensor data plays critical role in distributed data trans-
mission and computation [21]; another example is location
based services, people have a higher likelihood to be at
some locations than others; such as in Pairs, people are more
likely closer to Eiffel tower than a coffee shop nearby [22].
In mobile-health data collection, background knowledge
such as the likelihood of people having certain diseases
is available through previously published medical studies
[23]. When background information is available, (L)DP fails
to capture the explicit privacy leakage of user or the infor-
mation gain at the adversary. On the other hand, for a given
utility, (L)DP may not always be feasible depending on the
privacy budget [24]. Although approximate (, δ)-(L)DP is
introduced [25], [26] to realize an achievable mechanism,
the non-negative addend δ could be large enough (close to
1) to provide limited privacy guarantee.
1.2 Relaxing Local Differential Privacy
There’s a trend among the privacy research community that
leverages the background knowledge to relax the definition
of DP and the utility can be increased by explicitly modeling
the adversary’s knowledge. Privacy notions that consider
such prior knowledge are denoted as “context-aware” pri-
vacy notions. For context-aware privacy notions, besides the
privacy budget , the amount of required noise also depends
on the prior distribution of the data: context-dependent
privacy mechanisms add noise selectively according to the
data prior when most needed so that utility can be en-
hanced. For example, less noise is required to perturb for
data with higher certainty [20], [27]. In general the existing
context-aware privacy definitions fall into two categories
based on either average-case or worst-case guarantees. All
information-theoretic privacy notions belong to the former
class [28]–[30]. The latter includes Pufferfish [31], Bayes
DP [32], Membership privacy [33], etc. Average notions are
generally weaker than the latter since they cannot bound the
leakage for all the input and output pairs, which may not
be easily adopted by the users who are privacy-sensitive.
On the other hand, existing context-aware worst-case pri-
vacy notions like Pufferfish and Bayes DP still follow the
same structure of (L)DP – maximum ratio between two
likelihoods of a certain output given different input data.
Since the relationship with prior distribution is not directly
captured in the privacy notion, this makes context-aware
privacy mechanism design very difficult (either high com-
plexity or not easily composable).
1.3 Local Information Privacy
In this paper, we make use of the maximum ratio of pos-
terior to prior to capture information leakage in the local
setting, denote as local information privacy (LIP). Originally,
information privacy (IP) was proposed in a central setting
by Calmon et. al. [34], which requires a trusted curator.
Another reason that prohibits Centralized IP from being
adopted in practice is that the distribution of all users’
data is too complex to express or capture, especially for a
large-size dataset. In contrast, LIP requires only the prior
distribution of one particular user’s data, which can be
obtained through many approaches in practice.
An illustrative example of why context-aware privacy
notions result in increased utility is shown in Fig. 1, which
shows the perturbation mechanisms of context-free (LDP)
and context-aware (LIP) notions and the comparison of the
mean square errors when collecting private binary data with
specific prior. We illustrate the optimal perturbation proba-
bilities for the same privacy budget (epsilon=0.6) under both
LDP and LIP privacy notions. Observe that the perturbation
channel of LDP is symmetric, while LIP designs perturba-
tion parameters according to the prior knowledge. When
the data value is quite certain, it has smaller probability
to flip the value in order to increase the utility, while
when the data takes a value that has small probability of
happening, the mechanism also protect its privacy by a
large perturbation probability (a large amount of additive
noise). In this example, the probability of flipping the data
value through the LDP mechanism is 0.35 in contrast to
0.2 × 0.55 + 0.8 × 0.1 = 0.19 of the LIP mechanism. As a
result, LIP leads to an enhanced utility than LDP.
1.4 Main Contributions
The main contributions of this paper are listed as follow:
(1) We study a privacy notion called Local Information
Privacy (LIP) for local data release (without a trusted third
party), which relaxes the notion of LDP by incorporating
prior knowledge. We formally derive the relationships be-
tween existing definitions and LIP.
(2) We apply the LIP notion to privacy-preserving data
aggregation: we present a general framework to estimate
a function of the collected data and minimize the mean
squared error of the estimation while protecting each in-
dividual’s privacy by satisfying LIP constraints. Our mech-
anism can be viewed as a general form of randomized re-
sponse, also, we derive the optimal perturbation parameters
and the utility-privacy tradeoff. We further consider a latent
variable model, where the collected data is correlated with
some private latent properties of each user.
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Figure 1. LIP increases utility by explicitly designing perturbation parameters according to prior knowledge.
(3) We show how the proposed framework can be ap-
plied to different applications, including weighted summa-
tion as well as histogram. Both the optimal estimator at
the curator and the perturbation mechanism at the user
are derived. We derive the closed-form solutions for the
model with the same utility function but with LDP privacy
constraints, and theoretically compare the utility-privacy
tradeoff with LIP models.
(4) We validate our analysis using simulations on both
synthetic and real-world datasets (Karosak, a website-click
stream data set, and Adult, a survey of census income). Both
theoretical and simulation results show that mechanisms
under -LIP always achieve a better utility-privacy tradeoff
than those under -LDP.
Next, we enumerate the main differences from the ver-
sion in IEEE CNS 2018 [35]:
(1) The system model and framework generalization: In
[35], the aggregated data is binary and itself is private, in
this journal paper, besides generalizing to the setting where
the data domain contains multiple values, we also consider
a model where a private latent variable is correlated with
the aggregated data, such that the utility is measured by the
error in estimating the aggregated function, while protecting
the privacy of the latent variable. (2) We generalize the
privacy definition and explore its relationships with existing
definitions. (3) Theoretical analysis enhancement: In the
conference version, we derive the closed-form optimization
parameters under the binary model. In this journal exten-
sion, the utility-privacy tradeoff under the MIMO model is
derived. Also, we extend the model and analysis to con-
sider inaccurate/bounded prior knowledge. Additionally,
for the latent variable model, we show that given a privacy
budget, there is a prior distribution dependent threshold
under which the optimal mechanism directly releases the
raw data. (4) Realizations of more general applications: the
binary model in the conference version is only suitable for
the application of survey. In this journal extension, we use
the MIMO framework to handle more general applications
besides survey, including (weighted) summation and his-
togram. (5) Extensive experimental validation: Besides com-
paring the performance of the proposed mechanism with bi-
nary data, we make the following extensions in experiments:
a). We generate synthetic data and use real-world data with
a large domain and study the effect of data domain size on
the utility-privacy tradeoff. b). Machine learning methods
are deployed to learn the correlation between the aggre-
gated data and latent variables using real-world datasets.
c). We compare with both context-aware LDP and context-
free LDP to illustrate the need for introducing contextual
information.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In
Section 2, we describe the proposed LIP notion and its re-
lationship with other existing privacy notions. In Section 3,
we introduce the system model and problem formulation. In
Section 4, we derive the utility-privacy tradeoff under differ-
ent models including MIMO model, model with uncertain
prior and comparison with LDP model, and then we discuss
applications of these models. In Section 5, the model with
private latent variable is presented. In Section 6, we present
the simulation results and compare utility-privacy tradeoffs
for a variety of data sets and applications. In Section 7, we
offer concluding remarks.
2 PRIVACY DEFINITIONS AND RELATIONSHIPS
In this Section, we first recap several existing privacy no-
tions in the local settings, we then extend Information
Privacy to the local setting (LIP); finally, we study its re-
lationships with other notions.
2.1 Privacy Definitions
Denoted the raw private data as X , which takes value
from domain D, and has a prior θX . A privacy-preserving
mechanism M takes X as input, and releases a perturbed
version of Y as an output. Denote Y = Range(M) as the
domain of Y .
The context-free LDP definition states that any two in-
puts from the data domain D result in the same output with
similar probabilities.
Definition 1. (-Local Differential Privacy (LDP)) [36] A mech-
anismM which takes input X and outputs Y satisfies -LDP for
some  ∈ R+, if ∀x, x′ ∈ D and ∀y ∈ Y :
Pr(Y = y|X = x)
Pr(Y = y|X = x′) ≤ e
. (1)
LDP provides strong privacy protection, since it guaran-
tees indistinguishability of user’s inputs regardless of the
data prior distribution, and has led to multiple real-world
applications. However, such strong (worst-case) privacy
definition also leads to a significant utility loss.
When some context of X is available (e.g., prior distri-
bution), one can incorporate context (prior) information into
the privacy definition to explicitly model the adversaries’
knowledge. One such definition is pufferfish privacy, where
the adversary’s knowledge is defined by a subset of all
possible prior distributions. Pufferfish privacy is originally
proposed in the central setting [31], here we adapt it into
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the local setting where X and Y are each user’s input and
output, respectively.
Definition 2 (Local Pufferfish Privacy). Given a set of po-
tential secrets G, a set of discriminative pairs Gpairs, a set of
data evolution scenarios P , a privacy protection mechanism M
satisfies -Pufferfish (G, Gpairs, P) privacy, for some  ∈ R+ if
• for all possible inputs x ∈ D, y ∈ Y ,
• for all pairs (gi, gj) ∈ Gpairs of potential secrets,
• for all distributions θ ∈ P for which Pr(gi|θ) 6= 0 and
Pr(gj |θ) 6= 0,
the following holds:
e− ≤ Pr(M(x) = y|θ, gi)
Pr(M(x) = y|θ, gj) ≤ e
. (2)
In the definition of Pufferfish above, the raw data X
is correlated with a private latent variable G, and the
distribution θ captures their joint distribution. When the
set of priors P spans all possible joint distributions, this
also includes the case when X = G, and for such a special
case, pufferfish becomes equivalent to LDP. More generally,
however, pufferfish is a relaxation of LDP. Despite being
able to introduce priors in the privacy definition, one of
the drawbacks of Pufferfish privacy is the difficulty of
mechanism design. Recently, in [37], Wang et al. designed a
Wasserstein Mechanism, which achieves Pufferfish privacy,
but it is computationally inefficient, and the mechanism they
proposed is approximated.
Another context-aware privacy definition is mutual in-
formation privacy, which uses the mutual information be-
tween Y , X to measure the average information leakage of
X contained in Y :
Definition 3. (-Mutual Information Privacy (MIP)) [29] A
mechanism M which takes input X and outputs Y , satisfies -
MIP for some  ∈ R+, if the mutual information between X and
Y satisfies I(X;Y ) ≤ , where I(X;Y ) is:∑
x∈D,y∈Y
Pr(X = x, Y = y) log
Pr(X = x, Y = y)
Pr(X = x)Pr(Y = y)
. (3)
Although MIP is context-aware, it provides relative weak
privacy protection since it only bounds the average informa-
tion leakage over all possible x and y in the domain. There
may exist some (x, y) pairs making the ratio between the
joint and product of marginal distributions very large (while
the joint probability is very small).
Maximal Information Leakage, as a stronger privacy
notion than MIP, is defined as:
Definition 4. (-Maximal Information Leakage (MIL)) [38] For a
mechanismM which takes input X and outputs Y , the maximal
information leakage is defined as:
L(X → Y ) = log
∑
y∈Y
max
x∈D
Pr(Y = y|X = x), (4)
andM satisfies Maximal Information Leakage privacy if for some
 ∈ R+, ∀x ∈ D, y ∈ Y : L(X → Y ) ≤ .
MIL captures the average likelihood over all possible
y ∈ Y given the corresponding value of x that provides
the maximal likelihood probability. However, MIL does not
provide pairwise protection over all possible values of x and
y and hence is relatively weak.
Another context-aware privacy definition that provides
pairwise protection over each possible values of x and y is
differential identifiability.
Definition 5. (-Differential Identifiability (DI)) [39] A mecha-
nism M which takes input X and outputs Y satisfies -DI for
some  ∈ R+, if ∀x, x′ ∈ D and ∀y ∈ Y :
Pr(X = x|Y = y)
Pr(X = x′|Y = y) ≤ e
. (5)
The operational meaning of DI is, given the output y,
the adversary cannot tell whether the original data(set) is
x or x′. DI can be directly adapted for the local setting,
and is context-aware because DI also depends on the prior
distribution:
Pr(Y = y|X = x)Pr(X = x)
Pr(Y = y|X = x′)Pr(X = x′) ≤ e
.
Observe that, the likelihood of y given x (the perturbation
parameters) depends on the prior of x. One major drawback
of DI is the difficulty of designing practical mechanisms, as
DI is based on the ratio of posteriors, after transferring to
the ratios of two likelihoods, the likelihoods (perturbation
parameters) depend on the priors. For example, if Pr(X=x)Pr(X=x′)
is small, DI requires Pr(Y=y|X=x
′)
Pr(Y=y|X=x) to be large for all y ∈
Y . However, we know that ∑y∈Y Pr(Y = y|X = x′) =∑
y∈Y Pr(Y = y|X = x) = 1.
To provide a pairwise constraint on the information
leakage of X through Y , we consider a bound on the ratio
between the prior and posterior, which leads to the notion
of local information privacy:
Definition 6. (-Local Information Privacy (LIP)) Given a set
of potential prior distributions PX , a mechanismM which takes
input X and outputs Y satisfies -LIP for some  ∈ R+, if
∀x ∈ D, ∀θX ∈ PX and ∀y ∈ Y :
e− ≤ Pr(X = x|θX)
Pr(X = x|Y = y, θX) ≤ e
. (6)
There are three cases regarding the range of PX :
• When PX includes one given prior distribution, LIP
becomes LIP for fixed prior θX ;
• When PX includes all possible priors, LIP becomes Worst-
Case-LIP (WC-LIP);
• When PX includes a subset of all possible priors, LIP
becomes Bounded-Prior-LIP (BP-LIP).
Intuitively, LIP guarantees that having the knowledge of
the prior distribution, the adversary cannot infer too much
additional information about each input x by observing
each output y. Note that, when  is small, this ratio is
bounded close to 1.
The operational meaning of LIP can be interpreted as
protecting a user’s data privacy given the set of all the
possible prior distribution(s) PX . Compared with other
context-aware definitions, LIP (including BP-LIP and WC-
LIP) provides comprehensive modeling of the prior attain-
ability, including the scenarios where the prior knowledge
is uncertain, (WC-LIP can be viewed as context-free).
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Figure 2. Relationship between LIP and other privacy notions.
2.2 Relationships with Existing Definitions
2.2.1 LIP v.s. LDP
The following relationship holds between LIP and LDP: -
LIP implies 2-LDP and -LDP implies -LIP (proof is shown
in [35]). This implies that -LIP is a more relaxed privacy
notion than -LDP, however, it is stronger than 2-LDP.
Intuitively, LIP relaxes LDP because LDP defenses against
adversaries with arbitrary data prior v.s. a fixed prior of LIP.
When comparing the relationship between -WC-LIP
and -LDP, we have -WC-LIP is equivalent to -LDP (proof
is shown in [40]). Intuitively, these two definitions are equiv-
alent because both of them assume worst-case (context-
free) priors. Then the relationship between LDP and BP-LIP
is straightforward: -BP-LIP is sandwiched between -LDP
and -LIP. As a result, LIP (BP-LIP, WC-LIP) can be viewed
as context-aware versions of LDP with respect to different
assumptions on the data priors. We further compare the
utility privacy tradeoff between these two definitions in
terms of optimal mechanism design in Sec. 4.3.
2.2.2 LIP v.s. Local Pufferfish
Since in the definition of Local Pufferfish, X is correlated
with latent variable G, to make a fair comparison with LIP,
we consider the same situation, where Y is a noisy version
of X , which is correlated with a private latent variable G.
Denote θXG ∈ PXG as the joint distribution of X and G,
where PXG is the set of possible joint distributions of X,G.
Then, the definition of -LIP with latent variable for some
 ∈ R+ can be written as:
∀θXG ∈ PXG, ∀g ∈ G and ∀y ∈ Y :
e− ≤ Pr(G = g|θXG)
Pr(G = g|Y = y, θXG) ≤ e
. (7)
Considering the same set of potential joint distributions
(P in Local Pufferfish is identical to the PXG) in the two pri-
vacy notions, we next compare LIP (BP-LIP, WC-LIP) with
Local Pufferfish privacy according to different scenarios of
PXG. The results in the next lemma follow from the proof
of the relationship between LIP and LDP.
Lemma 1. The relationship between -LIP and -Local Pufferfish
can be described as follow:
• -WC-LIP is equivalent to -Local Pufferfish when PXG
includes all possible prior distributions of X and G;
• -Local Pufferfish implies -BP-LIP, and -BP-LIP implies
2-Local Pufferfish when PXG includes a subset of all
possible prior distributions of X and G.
When PXG includes all possible prior distributions of
X and G, -Local Pufferfish considers X = G (where the
leakage is maximized), which is equivalent to -LDP.
In summary, Local Pufferfish relaxes LDP by defining a
bounded set of possible prior distributions. Since the “dif-
ferential structure” in the definition of LDP does not allow
for the incorporation of prior knowledge, Pufferfish further
extends it by a correlated latent variable. This definition is
more general in terms of operational meaning. However,
it also comes with difficulties in mechanism design, as
the values of Pr(Y = y|G = g) averages over all the
likelihood probabilities of Pr(Y = y|X = x), which are
the perturbation parameters. On the other hand, LIP relaxes
LDP without the “differential structure” in the definition,
thus the prior knowledge can be directly leveraged in the
mechanism. We further study the model with latent variable
in Sec. 5.
2.2.3 LIP v.s. Other Context-aware Notions
We next compare the relationship between LIP and other
context-aware privacy notions under the assumption that
PX contains only the exact prior of X . Then, we have LIP is
stronger than MIP, since Pr(X=x,Y=y)Pr(X=x)Pr(Y=y) =
Pr(X=x)
Pr(X=x|Y=y) ≤
e. LIP is also stronger than MIL, as maxx∈D Pr(Y = y|X =
x) ≤ Pr(Y = y)e. Intuitively, among LIP, MIP and MIL,
only LIP provides pairwise protection over each possible
realization of x and y.
To compare the relationship between LIP and DI, we
first define the maximal ratio of two prior probabilities of
X as DX∞ = maxx,x′∈D log
Pr(X=x)
Pr(X=x′) , then, the relationship
between LIP and DI follows the next lemma with proof
provided in Appendix A.
Lemma 2. The relationship between LIP and DI is: -LIP implies
(2+DX∞)-DI and -DI implies (+D
X
∞)-LIP.
So far, if a mechanism satisfies -LIP, it implies -MIP,
-MIL, 2-LDP and (2 + DX∞)-DI. The main reasons why
we choose to study LIP instead of other notions are as
follows: (1) LIP is amenable to incorporate prior knowledge
and design mechanisms compared to other context-aware
definitions. (2) Compared with context-free LDP, LIP based
mechanisms achieve much higher utility.
In the following sections, we address how LIP mecha-
nisms can be designed according to the prior knowledge,
and how such mechanisms improve the privacy-utility
tradeoff for different types of applications.
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Table 1
List of symbols
D The universe of input values X Input random variable
θX User’s prior distribution G Private latent variable
Y Output random variable X¯ Set of input data
Y¯ Set of output data i Index of User
N Total number of users M Privacy preserving mechanism
q Set of perturbation parameters f(·) Aggregation function
Xˆ Estimator at the curator Sˆ Aggregated result
 Privacy budget U Utility measurement
E Mean square error function T Feasible region of q
3 MODELS AND PROBLEM FORMULATION
3.1 System and Threat Models
Consider a data aggregation system with N users and a
data curator. To answer query from the curator, each user
locally generates data which is denoted as random variable
Xi, taking value x from the domain D with the prior
distribution of θiX , specifically, denote P
i
x = Pr(Xi = x),
where i ∈ {1, 2, .., N} is the user index. It is assumed that
Xis are independent of each other (and may have different
distributions). To avoid potential privacy leakage, before
publishing Xi, each user locally perturbs it by a privacy-
preserving mechanism Mi. The output is denoted as Yi
which takes value of y from D (we discuss the optimal
support of y in Sec. 4.1). The mechanism maps each possible
input to each possible output with a certain probability
(perturbation parameter). After receiving each perturbed
data, the curator is allowed to further estimate and compute
a statistical function of the collected data. The system is
depicted in Fig. 3.
The curator is considered untrusted due to both internal
and external threats. On one hand, users’ private data is
profitable, and companies can be interested in user tracking
or selling their data. On the other hand, data breaches
happen from time to time due to hacking activities. The
curator aims at performing accurate estimations using all
the information above, but is also interested in inferring
each user’s data value Xi. Denote the true aggregated result
by S = f(X¯), where X¯ = {X1, X2, ..., XN}. For different
applications of data aggregation, the definition of f(·)s
varies. In this paper, two applications are considered:
• Weighted summation: the curator is interested in
finding the summation over users’ data: S =∑N
i=1 (ciXi + bi). When each ci = 1 and bi = 0,
the application is equivalent to a direct summation,
which is useful to find the average value;
• Histogram: the curator is interested in estimating
how many people possess each of the data category
in D, or classifying according to users’ data value: S
is a set of “categorized” data: {S1, S2, ..., Sd}, such
that, ∀k ∈ D, Sk =
∑N
i=1 1{Xi=k}, where 1{a=b} is
an indicator function, which is 1 if a = b; 0 if a 6= b.
When there are only two categories, such application
is also known as frequency estimation [17].
The curator (adversary) observes all the users’ outputs Y¯ =
{Y1, Y2, ..., YN} and tries to obtain an estimation of S using
estimator Sˆ.
In terms of prior availability, multiple scenarios could
arise in practice which involve different assumptions of
prior availability. For example, both the user and the curator
…
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X2
XN
… …
Raw Data
User
User 
User
…
M1
M2
MN
…
Y1
Y2
YN
…
Randomizer Perturbed Data Curator Aggregation
̂S = f(X¯)
…
1
2
3
Figure 3. System Model of Privacy-Preserving Data Aggregation.
know θiX exactly, or one party is uncertain about θ
i
X , or
they possess asymmetric prior knowledge that can also
be inaccurate. Within the scope of this paper, we assume
that the curator always knows the exact θiX , and the al-
gorithms/perturbation mechanisms that users deployed to
publish their data. In the basic setting, we assume each user
also possess the exact prior (same as the curator). Then we
relax it and consider uncertain prior at the user side (θiX is a
subset of PiX ). All the related symbols are listed in Table 1.
3.2 General Privacy and Utility Definitions
The privacy of each user’s is guaranteed by LIP and is pa-
rameterized by the privacy budget () in Definition (6). The
smaller  is, the stronger privacy guarantees the mechanism
provides. Note that, for simplicity, we consider  to be the
same for all the users; however, it is straightforward to ex-
tend our model and results to the scenarios where different
users are provided by different s. When the exact prior θiX
is not available for each user, he/she defines PiX to be the set
of plausible priors including θiX , note that users are always
allowed to enlarge the size of the PiX to include θiX . For
simplicity, we remove the conditional term in the probability
metric, i.e., Pr(Xi = x|θX) = Pr(Xi = x), thus, the privacy
constraints can be formulated as: ∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, x, y ∈ D,
θiX ∈ PiX there is
e− ≤ Pr(Xi = x|Yi = y)
Pr(Xi = x)
≤ e. (8)
Denote the perturbation parameter: qixy , {Pr(Yi =
y|Xi = x),∀x, y ∈ D}, by Bayes rule, Eq. (8) can be
expressed as:
e− ≤ q
i
xy∑
x∈D qixyP ix
≤ e. (9)
Denote qi as the set of perturbation probabilities in Mi,
then, when  and each Pix are given, the set of inequalities
in Eq. (9) forms a feasible region Ti for qi, ∀i ∈ 1, 2, ..N .
The definition of utility depends on the application sce-
nario. For example, in statistical aggregation, the estimation
accuracy is often measured by absolute error or mean square
error [41] [42]; in location tracking, it is typically measured
by Euclidean distance [22]; under information theoretical
framework, distortion is typically applied [29]. Without loss
of generality, denote U(S, Sˆ) as the utility.
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In general, there is a tradeoff between utility and privacy.
We can formulate the following optimization problem to
find the optimal mechanism that yields the optimal tradeoff:
maxU(S, Sˆ),
s.t. qi ∈ Ti, ∀i ∈ 1, 2, ..N.
(10)
3.3 Problem Formulation
Focusing on the two applications discussed above, we
define utility as the inverse of the Mean Square Error
(MSE), which is also adopted in many other works on
frequency/histogram estimation [17], [42], [43]: U(S, Sˆ) =
−E(S, Sˆ), where E(S, Sˆ) = E[(S − Sˆ)2]. Note that, for
weighted summation, the utility is data alphabet dependent
while for histogram estimation, it is data alphabet indepen-
dent, we show how MSE addresses these two different util-
ities in Sec. 4.4. Notice that, given P ix, The MSE E(S, Sˆ) de-
pends only on each user’s perturbation parameters: {qi}Ni=1,
as any estimation Sˆ depends on the output Y¯ whose distri-
bution is a function of {qi}Ni=1. Thus, maximizing the utility
is equivalent to finding optimal parameters to minimize the
MSE. As a result, the problem defined in Eq. (10) can be
specified as:
min E(q1, ...,qN ),
s.t. qi ∈ Ti, ∀i ∈ 1, 2, ..N.
(11)
Denote this model of optimization problem as the Opt-
LIP. From [44], it is well-known that the optimal estimator
that results in the minimized mean square error (MMSE)
is Sˆ = g(Y¯ ) = E[S|Y¯ ]. Since E[E[S|Y¯ ]] = E[S], Sˆ is an
unbiased estimator. Therefore, we use the MMSE estimator
in Eq. (11).
Problem Decomposition: Next, we show the problem
defined in Eq. (11) can be decomposed into each local user.
Since we assume that each user’s input is independent of
each other, all the f(·) functions above can be decomposed
into local functions of eachXi, without loss of generality, we
denote the local function for user i as fi. Thus we have local
function in weighted summation as fi(Xi) = ciXi+bi; local
functions in histogram are indicator functions (or vector):
{fki (Xi) = 1{Xi=k}}|D|k=1.
In the local setting, users independently perturb their
data, thus each of them results in an MSE in aggregation,
which is denoted by Ei = E[(fi(Xi) − E[fi(Xi)|Yi])2] (for
the application of histogram, denote Eki = E[(fki (Xi) −
E[fki (Xi)|Yi])2] as the MSE of aggregating the k-th data in
the i-th user’sXi), and the utility defined in Eq. (11) satisfies
decomposition theorem with proof provided in Appendix B.
Theorem 1. The global optimization problem defined in Eq. (11)
can be decomposed into N local optimization problems, under
independent user inputs.
min
{(qi)∈Ti}Ni=1
E(q1, ...,qN ) =
N∑
i=1
min
(qi)∈Ti
Ei(qi). (12)
By Theorem 1, when the perturbation parameters of each
user are optimal, the overall MSE of the mechanism achieves
its minimum. In addition, each user can perform its local
optimization independent of each other, which well suits
the local setting. Next, we formulate the utility and privacy
Xi Yia1
a2
ad
a1
a2
ad
… …
Pi1
Pi2
Pid
q22
qi21
q2d
Figure 4. Perturbation channel with multiple input and multiple output.
tradeoff as an optimization problem in each local case with
an MSE of:
Ei(qi) =E[(fi(Xi)− E[fi(Xi)|Yi])2]
=E{E[(fi(Xi)− E[fi(Xi)|Yi])2|Yi]}
=E[Var(fi(Xi)|Yi)]
(a)
= Var[fi(Xi)]− Var[E(fi(Xi)|Yi)],
(13)
where (a) follows the law of total variance.
Note that, when the prior of each Xi is known,
Var[fi(Xi)] is a constant. Without loss of generality, in the
following sections, denote Xi as the answer to the query
fi(Xi), and Eq. (13) becomes:
Ei(qi) = Var[Xi]− Var[Xˆi]. (14)
Thus the MSE is a function of the variance of each user’s
estimator. Define Xˆi = E[Xi|Yi] as the local estimator for
the i-th user, and we have Sˆ =
∑N
i=1 Xˆi, which follows
the user independence assumption. Thus, local optimization
problem for the i-th user can be reformulated as:
min Ei(qi) ≡ max Var(Xˆi),
s.t. qi ∈ Ti. s.t. qi ∈ Ti.
(15)
Which means, the optimal solutions are at the maximum of
the variance of the estimator, subject to the LIP constraints.
4 OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN UNDER LIP
In this Section, we study the privacy-utility tradeoffs ac-
cording to different scenarios of PiX , including fixed prior,
bounded priors, then, we compare the utility-privacy trade-
off of LIP to that of LDP (worst-case prior). Finally, we
discuss how to realize each of the two applications with
proposed frameworks.
4.1 Optimal Perturbation Parameters for A Fixed Prior
Next, we derive the closed-form optimal solutions under
the Opt-LIP model for any arbitrary but fixed prior. Un-
der a randomized response perturbation mechanism, the
perturbation channel and corresponding parameters are
shown in Fig. 4. Denote D = {a1, a2, ..., ad}, the prior
distribution as Pr(Xi = am) = P im, and the marginal
distribution of Pr(Yi = ak) = λik, the privacy metric
becomes, ∀m, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}:
e− ≤ Pr(Xi = am)
Pr(Xi = am|Yi = ak) ≤ e
. (16)
By Bayes rules, Eq. (16) can be expressed as:
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e− ≤ λ
i
k
qimk
≤ e. (17)
In the utility function of Eq. (14), Var[Xi] =
∑d
m=1 a
2
mP
i
m −
(
∑d
m=1 amP
i
m)
2, and the local estimator under the MIMO
model: Xˆmi (where m stands for MIMO model) becomes:
Xˆmi =E[Xi|Yi] =
d∑
m=1
amPr(Xi = am|Yi)
=
d∑
m=1
d∑
k=1
amPr(Xi = am|Yi = ak)1ik,
(18)
where 1ik is the indicator function of 1
i
{Yi=ak}, which
is 1 if Yi = ak and 0 if not, thus 1ik can be regarded as
a binary random variable which with the distribution of:
Pr(1ik = 1) = λ
i
k and Pr(1
i
k = 0) = 1 − λik, as a result:
Var[1ik] = λ
i
k(1− λik) and Cov[1ik,1il] = −λikλil .
Var(Xˆmi ) =
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanq
i
mkq
i
nkVar[1
i
k]
+
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
d∑
l=1;l 6=k
amanq
i
mkq
i
nlCov[1
i
k,1
i
l]
=
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanP
i
mP
i
nq
i
mk
qink(1− λik)
λik
−
d∑
l=1;l 6=k
qinl

=
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanP
i
mP
i
nq
i
mk
(
qink
λik
− 1
)
=
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
amanP
i
mP
i
n
(
d∑
k=1
qimkq
i
nk
λik
− 1
)
.
(19)
So far, Eq.(15) can be further expressed as ∀m, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d:
max Var(Xˆmi ),
s.t. e− ≤ λ
i
k
qimk
≤ e. (20)
The global optimal solutions follow the next Theorem,
with detailed proof provided in Appendix C.
Theorem 2. For the constrained optimization problem defined
in Eq. (20), the optimal solutions for the i-th user are: qi∗mm =
1− (1− P im)/e, qi∗mk = P ik/e, ∀m, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, m 6= k.
The constrained optimization problem defined in Eq.
(20) can be visualized in Fig. 5 (taking a binary example),
where the curves in the figure stand for the contour of
Var(Xˆm1 ) and the shaded area stands for the feasible region
of T i for a fixed prior and . Then the optimal solutions
are found at the boundary of the feasible region, which are
intersections of linear equations.
From Theorem 2, when  increases, ∀m ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, all
the qimms are increasing while all the q
i
mks are decreasing
(m 6= k), and the value of qimks are proportional to P iks, i.e.,
the optimal mechanism is more likely to output the values
with larger priors.
For example, suppose D = {1, 2, 3}, for the i-th user:
P1 = 0.1, P2 = 0.2, P3 = 0.7. By Theorem 2, q∗11 = 1 −
0.9/e, q∗22 = 1−0.8/e, q∗33 = 1−0.3/e, q∗21 = q∗31 = 0.1/e,
Contour of the Utility Function
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0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
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,
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eϵ
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eϵ
,1 −
1 − Pi1
eϵ
)
Figure 5. Illustration of the optimal solutions to the Opt-LIP model for
binary input and output.
q∗12 = q
∗
32 = 0.2/e
, q∗13 = q
∗
23 = 0.7/e
. When  grows, q∗11,
q∗22 and q
∗
33 also increase, which means Xi is more likely to
be directly published (Yi = Xi). When  is small, as “3” has
a larger prior than “1” and “2”, when Xi = 1 or Xi = 2, the
mechanism is more likely to output Yi = 3 to satisfy the LIP
constraints by increasing the posterior of Pr(Xi = 3|Yi) .
Remark 1. Notice that there are d! optimal solutions for a single
user in the problem, as we can randomly permute the order of Yi
to increase qimk for different k rather than q
i
mm as  increasing.
For example, in a binary model, when  increases, the mechanism
can either increase q11 and q00 or increase q01 and q10. As the
mechanism is known by the curator, for the second case, the
curator flips the estimated value.
Among all the optimal solutions, the one described in Theo-
rem 2 makes the output data Yi and the input data Xi share the
same distribution, as:
λik =P
i
k(1−
(1− P ik)
e
) +
∑
j 6=k
P ij
P ik
e
= P ik.
This property makes the optimal LIP mechanism more
useful in the real-world. In many applications, the released
data should be as close to the perturbed data as possible in
order to increase the data utility. For example, the reported
locations from smartphones: companies want to study the
aggregated location data on one hand, the users are up-
loading locations for location based service on the other.
As a result, although locally published data is perturbed,
it is favorable if it still provides certain level of accuracy
for individual data based queries, in addition to aggregated
query. Similar property is presented in [17], where authors
proposed a “pure” framework to make qimms increase while
other qimks decrease with .
Optimal Output Range: In terms of the optimal domain
size of each Yi, previous models are considering Yi has the
same domain with Xi. Now we consider the case where
Yi takes values from a different domain size. Denote the
domain of the input as Dx = {a1, a2, ..., ad}; the domain of
the output as Dy = {a1, a2, ..., af}. The following lemma
shows that when d is fixed, the optimal f∗ = d.
Lemma 3. In the Opt-LIP problem, when the input range of d is
fixed, the optimal output range f∗ is f∗ = d.
Detailed proof is shown in Appendix D.
As a result, in the following sections, we consider only
the settings where the domains of X and Y are identical.
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4.2 Optimal Perturbation Parameters for Bounded Pri-
ors
Next, we consider the case where each PiX includes multiple
possible priors for the i-th user, in other words, each user
has uncertainty on the exact prior. On the other hand,
under the context-aware setting, it is assumed that the
curator/adversary possesses the exact prior distribution.
Such scenarios exist when users possess less information
about X than the curator. For example, the curator has
recorded a full history of users’ previous released data in the
server such that the curator is able to infer each user’s prior;
another example is the curator can estimate a global prior
for all the users by observing each user’s released data; the
third example might be, the user is highly correlated with
someone (such as family members or close friends) whose
data has been collected or compromised, then the user’s
prior can be inferred by the curator via the correlations.
In this uncertain prior model, the exact prior θiX is not
available for each user, as a result, the prior-dependent
utility function defined in Eq. (14) can not be calculable
either. In such case, for each user, the local MSE function
for him/her is determined by both of his/her perturbation
parameters as well as exact prior distribution, i.e., Ei(qi) in
Eq. (14) becomes Ei(θiX ,qi).
As the Ei(θiX ,qi) depends on the perturbation param-
eters qi as well as the exact prior distribution θiX . Under
the uncertain prior model, One feasible minimax strategy
for each user is to find the maximized Ei(θ˜iX ,qi) achieved
by a prior of θ˜iX ∈ PiX and find qi∗ which minimizes
Ei(qi|θ˜iX) (other feasible strategies exist, such as minimizing
E[Ei(θiX ,qi)], however are out of the scope of this paper).
Thus the problem for the i-th user under the model with
uncertain prior becomes:
min
qi
max
θ˜iX∈PiX
Ei(θ˜iX ,qi),
s.t. qi ∈ Ti.
(21)
Note that the feasible region Ti in Eq. (21) is different
from the one defined for a fixed prior. It uses BP-LIP’s
definition, i.e., LIP must be satisfied for a family of priors.
Denote this model with optimization problem in Eq. (21)
as Opt-BP-LIP. Note that, the utility function in Eq.(21):
Ei(θ˜iX ,qi) = Var(Xi)−Var(Xˆbpi ), where Xˆbpi is the optimal
estimator at the curator. As Var(Xi) depends only on the
exact prior of θiX , the goal of each user is still to maximize
Var(Xˆbpi ). Thus Eq.(21) can be further expressed as:
max
qi∈T i
min
θ˜iX∈PiX
Var[Xˆbpi (θ˜
i
X ,q
i)]. (22)
The optimal solutions of the MIMO model of each user
with bounded priors depend on the concrete PiX and thus
can only be derived numerically (the comparison result is
shown in Sec. 6). We next derive the optimal parameters
under a binary model. Firstly, specify PiX as P i1 = Pr(Xi =
1) ∈ [a, b], where 0 ≤ a ≤ b ≤ 1. The optimal solutions
correspond to the following proposition:
Proposition 1. For the constrained optimization problem defined
in Eq. (22) with binary input/output, the optimal solutions for the
i-th user are: qi∗01 =
bi
bi−ai+e and q
i∗
10 =
1−ai
bi−ai+e .
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Figure 6. Illustration of the optimal solutions under LIP, BP-LIP and
LDP(WC-LIP).
Proof. From the proof of Theorem 2, for any θiX , the maxi-
mized Var(Xˆbpi ) is achieved at the minimized values of q
i
01
and qi10, which are found at the boundary of the privacy con-
straints, and are achieved when maxP i1∈[a,b]
Pr(Yi=1)
qi01
= e
and maxP i1∈[a,b]
Pr(Yi=0)
qi10
= e.
Observe the expression of qi∗01 and q
i∗
10, when ai = bi =
P i1 , which means the prior knowledge is certain and fixed,
in this case qi∗01 =
P i1
e and q
i∗
10 =
1−P i1
e which are identical to
the optimal solutions of Theorem 2; When ai = 0, bi = 1,
we have the optimal solutions for the WC-LIP: qi∗01 = q
i∗
10 =
1
1+e , which is independent of prior. This result shows that
the BP-LIP provides a bridge between the notions of LIP,
WC-LIP by adjusting prior uncertainty.
4.3 Comparison with LDP
The original LDP notion is defined in the context-free set-
ting, which is not directly comparable with LIP. In this
part, we derive utility-privacy tradeoff for LDP notion in a
context-aware setting: we assume the curator still possesses
the prior distribution of each user’s local data, thus, the
estimator is prior-dependent and the form is identical to
Xˆmi . As a result, the optimization problem of the LDP
model has the same utility function as in Opt-LIP model, but
subject to LDP constraints, i.e., the local optimal parameters
for the i-th user correspond to the optimization problem:
min Ei(qi),
s.t.
Pr(Yi = y|Xi = x)
Pr(Yi = y|Xi = x′) ≤ e
,∀y, x, x′ ∈ D. (23)
Denote this model with optimization problem in Eq. (23)
as Opt-LDP. The privacy constraints in Eq. (23) can be ex-
pressed as: ∀m,n, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, m 6= n: qimk
qink
≤ e. Learn
from the proof of Theorem 2, in order to increase utility, the
optimal mechanism increases qikks while decreasing q
i
mks.
Thus, the optimal solutions are at the boundaries of the
LDP constraints of q
i
kk
qimk
= e. The solutions correspond to
the following proposition:
Proposition 2. The optimal solutions of the Opt-LDP model are
qi∗mm =
e
e+d−1 , q
i∗
mk =
1
e+d−1 , ∀m, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d, m 6= k.
Similar results can also observed from [17], in which a
different utility goal is defined.
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Denote ELIP∗i as the local MSE from collecting the i-th
user’s data under LIP constraints and ELDP∗i as that under
LDP constraints. Comparing ELIP∗i with ELDP∗i , we have
the following proposition:
Proposition 3. Given an arbitrary but fixed prior distribution,
∀ ∈ R+, there is ELIP∗i ≤ ELDP∗i .
Proof. Since ELIP∗i and ELDP∗i are the objective function
evaluated at different optimal solutions satisfying corre-
sponding privacy constraints. It suffices to show that the
optimal perturbation parameters of LDP are within the
feasible region of LIP. As -LDP implies -LIP, ∀ ≥ 0, which
means all the qis that satisfying LDP automatically satisfies
LIP.
Notice that, even the curator may take advantage of his
prior knowledge to make a further estimation, LDP based
mechanism still suffers a decreased utility than LIP because
LIP also utilizes the prior knowledge for mechanism design.
Also note that the Opt-LDP model and Opt-LIP model
only differ in the feasible regions formed by corresponding
privacy constraints, while the feasible region of LDP is fixed
for all possible priors, the feasible region of LIP reshapes
when the prior changes. Consider a worst-case scenario,
and comparing the feasible regions formed by LIP and LDP
constraints, we have the following remark:
Remark 2. The feasible region of LDP is the intersection of the
feasible regions of LIP with all possible priors
We visualize this remark combined with BP-LIP in
Fig. 6 using a binary example, where we can observe
the feasible regions of LIP with different priors (P i1 =
0.01, 0.25, 0.5 , 0.75 , 0.99 respectively), the feasible region
of LIP with a bounded set of priors (P i1 ∈ [0.5, 1]) as well
as the feasible region of LDP. To achieve high utility, qi01
and qi10 should be as small as possible. From Theorem 2,
Proposition 1 and Proposition 2. The optimal parameters
(qi01, q
i
10) under the three models are (
0.01
e ,
0.99
e ), (
0.25
e ,
0.75
e ),
( 0.5e ,
0.5
e ), (
0.75
e ,
0.25
e ), (
0.99
e ,
0.01
e ) for LIP with different pri-
ors; ( 10.5+e ,
0.5
0.5+e ) for BP-LIP and (
1
1+e ,
1
1+e ) for LDP, re-
spectively. Obviously, the optimal solution of LDP provides
reduced utility compared to that of LIP and BP-LIP. The
feasible region of BP-LIP is the intersection of the feasible
regions of LIP with P i1 = 0.5 and P
i
1 = 1; The feasible
region of LDP is the intersection of the feasible regions of
LIP with all possible priors.
Next, we use a binary example to illustrate how the
concrete prior distribution affects the utility resulted by LIP
and LDP in terms of MSE.
When Xi is binary, Opt-LIP results in local MSE of:
ELIP∗i = P i1(1− P i1)(2e− − e−2), (24)
in contrast to
ELDP∗i = P i1(1− P i1)−
[P i1(1− P i1)(1− e)]2
(1− P i1 + P i1e)(e − P i1e + P i1)
,
(25)
provided by Opt-LDP.
It is readily shown that ELIP∗i ≤ ELDP∗i , where ELIP∗i =
ELDP∗i if  = 0 or∞. We then take derivative with respect to
P i1 over ∆Ei = ELDP∗i − ELIP∗i , result shows that ∂∆Ei∂P i1 = 0
when P i1 = 0.5. Result also shows that when |P i1 − 0.5|
increases, ∆E also increases.
4.4 Real-world Applications of LIP
Next, we discuss how to apply the model described above
for the two applications.
4.4.1 Application to (Weighted) Summation
Summation results usually measure an average property of
the surveyed individuals, and it is straightforward to extend
the direct summation to a weighted summation (plus an
offset) for more general applications. For example, assume
that the curator is interested in some particular users more
than others, such as employer v.s. employees; adults v.s.
children; the professionals v.s. amateurs. These “important”
users’ data are assigned with larger coefficients than others.
The offset can be used as a correction to the raw data.
For data summation, the collected data from each user
is from a large domain. In this case fi(Xi) = Xi, and the
MIMO model is suitable for this application. For weighted
summation, fi(Xi) = ciXi + bi, and the aggregated re-
sult is Ssum =
∑N
i=1(ciXi + bi) with the estimator of
Sˆsum =
∑N
i=1(ciXˆ
s
i + bi), when ci and bi are known, the
MSE becomes:
E[(Ssum − Sˆsum)2]
=E
{
(
N∑
i=1
[ci(Xi − Xˆsi )])2
}
=E

N∑
i=1
c2i (Xi − Xˆsi )2 +
N∑
i,j=1
cicj(Xi − Xˆsi )(Xj − Xˆsj )

(a)
=
N∑
i=1
c2iE[(Xi − Xˆsi )2],
where (a) follows the independent user assumption. By de-
composition theorem, this problem becomes identical to that
of the Opt-LIP model. Note that, when users have uncertain
priors, as long as the curator possesses each accurate θiX ,
he is able to design each local unbiased estimator accord-
ingly, which makes the global utility of E[(Ssum − Sˆsum)2]
decomposable.
Remark 3. The optimal perturbation parameters for the appli-
cation of (weighed) summation follow the solutions of the Opt-
LIP model in Theorem 2, while each local estimator changes from
Xˆmi to Xˆ
s
i = ciXˆ
m
i + bi. Similar results can be concluded in
the uncertain prior models of Opt-BP-LIP and Opt-LDP with
corresponding optimal solutions.
4.4.2 Application to Histogram Estimation
Histogram is useful to estimate or compare the popularity
or frequency of some categories. The difference between
the application of the histogram and other applications is:
even though for each user, the perturbation mechanism still
takes one input data and outputs one data, the estimator is a
random vector rather than a random variable, as the value of
each data stands for a category. It can be viewed as a general
form of survey, where a binary category is aggregated.
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Figure 7. The model of data aggregation with latent variable.
We can obtain the estimator of the histogram vector,
Sˆhist = {Sˆ1, Sˆ2, ..., Sˆd} = {E[S1|Y¯ ], E[S2|Y¯ ], ..., E[Sd|Y¯ ]},
with each entry E[Sm|Y¯ ]:
E
{
N∑
i=1
1{Xi=am}|Y¯
}
=
N∑
i=1
Pr(Xi = am|Yi). (26)
Thus the mean square error of the estimation is
d∑
m=1
E
( N∑
i=1
{1{Xi=am} − E[1{Xi=am}|Yi]}
)2
(a)
=
d∑
m=1
N∑
i=1
E[({1{Xi=am} − E[1{Xi=am}|Yi]})2]
=
N∑
i=1
d∑
m=1
{Var(1{Xi=am})− Var(E[1{Xi=am}|Yi])}.
(27)
The (a) of Eq. (27) is because each user’s local error is
independent, and the expectation of the unbiased estima-
tor is identical to that of the estimated value. Hence, the
problem of estimating a histogram can be formulated as,
∀m, k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, i ∈ {1, 2...N}:
min Eq. (27),
s.t. e− ≤ λ
i
k
qimk
≤ e. (28)
The optimal solution for the above problem are presented in
the following corollary:
Corollary 1. The optimal solutions of the problem defined in
Eq. (28) follow Theorem 2, with each local estimator of Xˆhi =
{Pr(Xi = a1|Yi), P r(Xi = a2|Yi), ..., P r(Xi = ad|Yi)}.
Similar results can be concluded in the uncertain prior models of
Opt-BP-LIP and Opt-LDP with corresponding optimal solutions.
Proof is provided in Appendix F.
Note that, by defining MSE as the utility, the function
of (weighted) summation depends on the data alphabets,
which means the difference of data values during aggrega-
tion also determines the performance of the mechanism. On
the other hand, the utility function of histogram estimation
is data alphabet independent, as the aggregated value in
each class is the number of users. However, MSE adequately
describes the utility in each scenario by designing local
function fi() for each user. For summation, fi is value-
dependent, while for histogram, fi is designed with indica-
tor functions that transfer the data alphabets into a sequence
of probabilities.
5 OPTIMAL MECHANISM DESIGN WITH LATENT
VARIABLE FOR A GIVEN PRIOR
In many applications, the user’s secret information to be
protected is different from but correlated with the data being
collected. For example, wearable sensors or fitness trackers
can collect data about a person’s acceleration, body tem-
perature, heart rate and etc, to infer his/her daily activity
Xi Yi
0
1
0
1
1 − Pi1
Pi1
q1
q0
1 − q1
1 − q0
Gi
0
1
Ti01
Ti10
Ti11
Ti00
Figure 8. Perturbation channel of the model with latent variable (for
binary input and binary output).
pattern or exercise amounts; however he/she may wish
to prevent the inference of sensitive disease information
from those data, as such data may lead to discrimination
from insurance companies if they obtain the data. As an-
other example, smart meters collect people’s daily usage
of electricity and use statistical information to optimize the
operation of the grid, but each individual household does
not wish to reveal which appliance they are using at a given
time. Similarly, big companies collect people’s location data
for statistical analysis, but a user may want to hide some
specific event/pattern in her location trace, or the private
social relationship with another user.
To cope with the above scenarios, we extend the defini-
tion of LIP to consider latent variables.
5.1 Utility-Privacy Formulations with Latent Variable
The model is depicted in Fig. 7. For each user, the raw data is
denoted as Xi which is correlated with a latent variable Gi
with some joint distribution. Denote G as the universe of all
the latent variables, and T igx as the conditional probability
of Pr(Xi = x|Gi = g) for all x ∈ D and g ∈ G.
Under LIP, the privacy constraints can be formulated as:
∀i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N}, ∀g ∈ G and y ∈ D, there is
e− ≤ Pr(Gi = g|Yi = y)
Pr(Gi = g)
≤ e. (29)
By Bayes rules, given the values of T igxs for all x ∈ D and
g ∈ G, the metric in Eq. (29) can be further expressed as a
function of qixy :
e− ≤
∑
x∈D q
i
xyT
i
gx∑
x∈D qixyP ix
≤ e. (30)
The constrained optimization problem in Eq. (15) under
the model with latent variables can be formulated as, ∀i ∈
{1, 2, ..., N}, g ∈ G, y ∈ D:
max Var(Xˆmi ),
s.t. Eq. (30).
(31)
In general, the closed-form optimal solution for the con-
strained optimization problem of Eq. (31) cannot be directly
derived, as the number of linear constraints is quadratically
proportional to the dimensions of Xi and Gi, and the valid
constraints depend on the concrete values of the priors and
correlations. We numerically present the results and show
the properties of the model with latent variables in Sec. 6.
5.2 Optimal Solutions under Binary Model
Next, we derive closed-form optimal solutions for the
model with binary input/output, which is arbitrarily cor-
related with a binary latent variable. The binary model is
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Figure 9. Illustration of the optimal perturbation channel with latent
variable.
widely used for survey, where each individual’s data is
first mapped to one bit, then randomly perturbed before
publishing to the curator.
In this model, D = G = {0, 1} (shown in Fig. 8). Var(Xi)
in Eq. (14) becomes P i1(1− P i1). Denote the parameters as:
Pr(Yi = 1|Xi = 0) = qi0,
P r(Yi = 0|Xi = 1) = qi1.
Thus, the local MMSE estimator Xˆbi becomes:
Xˆbi = E[Xi|Yi] =P i1
[
qi1
λi0
(1− Yi) + 1− q
i
1
λi1
Yi
]
, (32)
where λi0 = Pr(Yi = 0) = (1 − P1)(1 − qi0) + P1qi1 and
λi1 = Pr(Yi = 1) = (1− P1)qi0 + P1(1− qi1). Then,
Var(Xˆbi ) =Var
{
P i1
[
qi1
λi0
(1− Yi) + 1− q
i
1
λi1
Yi
]}
= P i1
(λi0 − qi1)2
λi0λ
i
1
.
(33)
For the privacy constraints, by Eq. (29), when the pertur-
bation mechanism satisfies -LIP, the feasible region T hi is
formed by:
e− ≤ {F i1, F i2} ≤ e, ∀i = 1, 2...N. (34)
where F i1, F
i
2 are directly derived from Eq. (30):
F i1(q
i
0, q
i
1, g) =
(1− qi0)T ig0 + qi1T ig1
qi1P
i
1 + (1− qi0)(1− P i1)
F i2(q
i
0, q
i
1, g) =
qi0T
i
g0 + (1− qi1)T ig1
(1− qi1)P i1 + qi0(1− P i1)
.
So far, the utility-privacy tradeoff of the binary model with
latent variables can be formulated as:
max
(qi0,q
i
1)∈T hi
Var(Xˆbi ). (35)
We next derive the optimal qi1 and q
i
0: firstly, define
T iug1 = maxg∈G T
i
g1; T
il
g1 = ming∈G T
i
g1. Then the optimal
qi1 and q
i
0 correspond to the following Theorem:
A threshold related to ϵ
LIP between    and 
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YX
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Figure 10. Relation between correlation and required amount of noise.
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Theorem 3. The optimal qi0 and q
i
1 of the problem defined in Eq.
(35) are:
qi∗0 = max{0,
T iug1 − P i1e
(e + 1)(T iug1 − P i1)
,
P i1 − T ilg1e
(e + 1)(P i1 − T ilg1)
}
qi∗1 = max{0,
1 + T iug1e
 − e − P i1
(e + 1)(T iug1 − P i1)
,
1 + P i1e
 − e − T ilg1
(e + 1)(P i1 − T ilg1)
}.
The proof is shown in Appendix E.
Compare with the optimal solutions in Theorem 2, we
have that the optimal qi∗1 and q
i∗
0 in the model with latent
variables are always smaller than that of the Opt-LIP model.
Note that, when Xi = Gi, qi∗0 = P
i
1/e
, qi∗1 = (1 − P i1)/e,
which means these two models are equivalent. On the other
hand, if max{T iug1/P i1, P i1/T ilg1} ≤ e, qi∗0 = 0; If max{(1 −
T ilg1)/(1−P i1), (1−P i1)/(1−T iug1 )} ≤ e, qi∗1 = 0; when both
conditions are satisfied, Xi is directly published.
Key insights from the binary model with latent variables
is, when X is highly correlated with G (T iug1 is large and T
il
g1
is small), X should be heavily perturbed in order to protect
G; When X is almost independent of G (T iug1 and T
il
g1 are
close to P i1), X can be released with slight perturbation,
such insight is depicted in Fig. 9.
5.3 Properties of MIMO model with latent variables
While the closed-form solutions for the MIMO model with
latent variables are not straightforward, with the key in-
sights of the binary model, we next derive some properties
for the MIMO model with latent variables.
Firstly, the optimal solution in Theorem 2 is also a
feasible solution of the problem defined in Eq. (31):
When Yi is released satisfying -LIP with respect to Xi,
the privacy constraints in Eq. (30) is bounded by:
e− ≤ minx∈D q
i
xy∑
x∈D q
i
xyP ix
≤
∑
x∈D q
i
xyT
i
gx∑
x∈D q
i
xyP ix
≤ maxx∈D q
i
xy∑
x∈D q
i
xyP ix
≤ e
(36)
Which means Eq. (30) is satisfied.
As a result, protecting the privacy of a latent variable
rather than the raw data enlarges the feasible region of the
perturbation parameters, and hence, an increased utility can
be achieved. We next show that, under some conditions, the
privacy requirements are met without introducing noise.
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Figure 12. Utility-privacy tradeoff comparison when N users have different local priors.
Proposition 4. For the constrained optimization problem defined
in Eq. (31), if for some a ∈ D,
max{maxg∈G T
i
ga
P ia
,
P ia
ming∈G T iga
} ≤ e, (37)
the optimal qi∗ma = 0 and q
i∗
aa = 1, ∀m 6= a.
Proof. Suppose for some a ∈ D, qiaa = 1 and qima = 0,
based on Eq.(30), ∀g ∈ G, there is e− ≤ T
i
ga
P ia
≤ e. On the
contrary, if this condition is satisfied, to maximize utility,
the mechanism decreases qima while increasing q
i
mm, thus
qi∗ma = 0 and q
i
aa = 1.
Which means if Xi = a, the mechanism directly releases
Yi = Xi; It’s straightforward to extend to: if ∀x ∈ D,
max{maxg∈G T
i
gx
P ix
,
P ix
ming∈G T igx
} ≤ e, then the mechanism di-
rectly releases Yi = Xi.
Notice that, ∀x ∈ D and ∀g ∈ G, the bounded ratio
in Eq. (37) equals to 1 when Xi and Gi are independent,
which means directly releasing Xi leaks no information
about Gi, if the ratio is bounded close to 1, and the closeness
is measured by [e−, e], directly releasing Xi also does not
violate the privacy requirement. Such property of the model
with latent variables can be better illustrated in Fig.10.
6 EVALUATION
In this Section, we present simulation results to validate our
analytical results. In the first part, we validate our analysis
using synthetic data and via Monte-Carlo simulation. With
synthetic data, we show the advantages of the context-
aware privacy notion (based on LIP) versus the context-free
notion (based on LDP) by comparing their utility-privacy
tradeoffs. Then we compare different models of LIP and
LDP and show how the dataset domain affects the results.
By Monte-Carlo simulation, we consider a latent variable
Gi that is arbitrarily correlated with Xi and compare the
utility-privacy tradeoffs provided by local models. In the
second part, we evaluate with real-world datasets: Gowalla
(location check-ins) and Census Income (People income
survey).
We evaluate utility by square root average MSE, in order
to normalize the influence of user count, also to make it com-
parable to the absolute error. Note that, doing so does not
affect the optimalities in any of our optimization problems.
In addition, since LIP achieves a relaxed privacy level than
LDP, it is difficult to compare their utilities under the same
privacy guarantee. Thus, we compare their optimal utilities
under any given privacy budget . All the simulations are
done in Matlab (R2016a) on a Dell desktop (OptiPlex 7040;
CPU: Intel (R) Core (TM) i5-6500 @ 3.2GHz; RAM 8.0 GB;
OS: windows 64bit).
6.1 Simulation Results with Synthetic Data
6.1.1 Benefit of Context-awareness
Firstly, we would like to compare the utility-privacy trade-
offs between -LIP and -LDP using the binary model. The
goal is to show the advantage of our proposed context-
aware notion versus context-free notion of LDP. Intuitively,
the utility gain of the former can be attributed to two
factors: 1) using the prior in the MMSE estimator, which
improves the accuracy compared with estimators that do
not use prior knowledge; 2) the privacy guarantee of LIP
is relaxed compared with LDP, by explicitly modeling prior
in the definition. As a result, less noise is needed to satisfy
the same privacy budget . To decouple the influence of the
above two factors, we compare the utility-privacy tradeoff
of LIP notions with two other LDP notions: for the first LDP
notion, we use prior-independent estimator Cˆ [17]. This
model treats Xi as instances rather than random variables:
Cˆ =
∑N
i=1 Yi −Npi
1− 2pi , (38)
where qimk = pi =
e
e+d−1 , ∀m 6= k is the optimal per-
turbation parameter. This is an unbiased estimator, which
results in an MSE of:
E[(S − Cˆ)2] = Var[Cˆ] = N(d− 2 + e
)
(e − 1)2 . (39)
The second LDP model is the Opt-LDP model, which is
discussed in Section 4.3.
The comparison is shown in Fig. 11, where  ranges from
1 to 5 with a step of 0.5. For now, we assume that N users
share the same global prior. We can observe that, the square
root average MSE of “-Opt-LDP” is always smaller than
that of “context-free LDP” under any given s. When P1 =
0.5 (prior is uniformly distributed), the distance between
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these two models is smaller; when the prior is more skewed,
advantage of the former is even enhanced. This validates the
benefit of the context-aware estimator. On the other hand, by
comparing the curves of “-Opt-LDP” and “-LIP” (using
the same MMSE estimator), the error of Opt-LIP is always
smaller than that of Opt-LDP, and the gap between the two
models increases when P1 = 0.99. This result confirms that
our relaxed prior-aware privacy notion leads to an enhanced
utility. When P1 = 0.99, users’ inputs are highly certain,
merely considering prior in the estimator can already result
in accurate aggregation. Thus the advantage of the -LIP is
even enhanced.
6.1.2 Impact of Prior Uncertainty, Domain Size and Corre-
lation with Latent Variable on Different models
We now evaluate the utility-privacy tradeoffs of the LIP
notion when D has a large domain. The number of users
and the domain size of each user are fixed as N = 5000
and |D| = 5, respectively. Without loss of generality, we
assume D = {0, 1, 2, 3, 4}, with the prior of each value
randomly generated for 5 times. The set of priors are used
as the bounded range (all plausible prior distributions), and
one of them is used as the true prior. The utility-privacy
tradeoffs are shown in Fig.12(a). The figure shows that the -
Opt-LIP provides the most enhanced utility compared with
other models; The -LDP is sandwiched between -LIP and
2-LIP; Moreover, the -BP-LIP also provides better utility
compared to -LDP. According to the analysis in Sec. 4.3,
when the bounded prior set includes all possible priors, -
WC-LIP is equivalent to -LDP.
We next compare how the data domain affects the LIP
and LIP: Consider 5000 users are in the system with the
domain size of each user’s data from |D| = 2 to |D| = 20.
We then fix  = 1 and show the utilities with different input
domain size. In Fig.12(b), we observe that when |D| is small,
the -MIMO-LDP model provides better utility than the
/2-MIMO-LIP model. However, as |D| increases, the /2-
MIMO-LIP eventually outperforms -MIMO-LDP. We can
also observe that both the LDP and LIP models suffer from
decreased utility when the |D| increases, but the LIP models
decrease linearly while the LDP model decreases faster than
that. In comparison, central IP suffers the least influence
from the increasing size of the domain.
Then, we study the cases with a latent variable correlated
with each Xi. We use Monte-Carlo Simulation to study the
convergence of performance when N increases. Fig. 12(c)
shows the comparison among the three models described
above. For the dataset, we assume each user’s data X has
an arbitrary domain size between 2 and 10, the prior of the
data is then randomly sampled according to the domain
size. The dataset also contains a latent variable G, which
has the same data size with X and a randomly generated
correlation with X : TGX . In the local setting, we assume
that each user publishes Yi using the LIP/LDP models with
perturbation parameters as solutions of the optimization
problem defined in Eq. (15) (the problem is solved by the
built-in optimizer of Matlab). The curator aggregates data
using corresponding estimators discussed above. The error
is measured by the averaged squared error, which is derived
from 10000 times simulations, which are shown in Fig.12(c).
We can observe that -LIP always provides higher utility
than -LDP under any . Also, the curve of -LDP is almost
sandwiched between the ones of /2-LIP and -LIP. Notice
that the error diminishes to 0 as  increases, that is because
the correlation between the raw data and the private latent
variable is weak. For a given , directly releasing the raw
data is still secure for the privacy of the latent variable.
6.2 Simulation with Real-world Datasets
6.2.1 Location Check-In Dataset
In this Section, we compare the performance of different
models with the real-world dataset Gowalla, which is a
social networking application where users share their lo-
cations by checking-in. There are 6,442,892 users in this
dataset. For each user, a trace of his/her check-in locations is
recorded. For this dataset, we wish to estimate a histogram
of users’ last check-in location. We first divide the area into
36×36 districts, then map each user’s locations into districts.
Each user’s past check-in locations are used for calculating
a global prior of the last check-in location for all the users.
As we studied in Section 4.4.2, for each user, the last check-
in location is perturbed according to the LIP (LDP) channel
and a random vector estimator is used for the curator to
estimate the histogram. The results are shown in Fig. 13(a),
where similar trends can be observed as in the empirical
results. Note that compared with the theoretical results from
Fig. 7, the advantage of LIP is even enhanced in Fig. 13(a),
that is because the theoretical analysis uses data from a
domain with |D| = 20. On the other hand, in the dataset of
Gowalla, the input data is from a domain with |D| = 36×36,
even though many of the districts has 0 users checking-in,
which results in zero priors for these districts. Based on the
MIMO perturbation mechanism, for those districts with 0
prior, the system will also never output those districts, as a
result, the data domain is equivalent to a much decreased
one. Nevertheless, the effective domain size is |D| = 83,
which is much larger than 20. When domain size is larger,
the advantage of LIP is enhanced.
6.2.2 Latent Variable Privacy for Dataset of Annual Income
Survey
Next, we testify our analysis of the model with latent
variables by simulation on a real-world dataset: “Census
income” (Adult dataset). This is a census survey dataset in
which 48842 users’ personal information is listed, includ-
ing 14 attributes, such as: age, work class, marriage, race,
gender, education, and annual income. We assume each
user’s data is published and collected independently. In
the field of machine learning, the Adult dataset is usually
used for predicting whether each user’s annual income is
over 50k dollars by training on all the personal information
(taken as features). In this experiment, we want to aggregate
users’ work classes while protecting the annual incomes.
In this dataset, the aggregated data Xi, work class, has
a domain size of 8: {Private, Self-emp-not-inc, Self-emp-
inc, Federal-gov, Local-gov, State-gov, Without-pay, Never-
worked}. Each user’s annual income, Gi, also has a domain
size of 8: {below 20K, 20k-30k, 30k-40k, 40k-50k, 50k-60k,
60k-70k, 70k-80k, over 80k}, We use number 0 to 7 to stand
for each of them and statistically calculate the frequency of
each value to be the priors. We then, find the correlation
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Figure 13. Utility-privacy tradeoff comparisons using real-world data.
between each user’s work class and the annual income
by deep learning (built-in network of Tensorflow). Then
each user publishes his work class by the Opt-LIP/ Opt-
LDP mechanism described in Section IV. The comparison
is shown in Fig. 13(b). From which, we observe that the
proposed Opt--LIP model provides better utility than -
LDP. Compared with Monte-carlo simulations, with this
dataset, each model requires a larger  to diminish to 0,
because the latent variable G is highly correlated with the
X . In order to protect the privacy of G, it requires larger
probabilities to be perturbed than the cases with arbitrary
correlations between X and G.
From the experiment results, we have the following
insights: a) context-aware privacy notions achieve better
utility than context-free notions, and when the prior is
more skewed, the advantage becomes even enhanced; b)
LIP notion achieves better utility than the LDP notions
when using the same prior related estimator, the utility
gain lies in measuring the prior knowledge in the privacy
notion. c) When the data domain increases, the utility under
each notion decreases, but the decreased amount of the LIP
notion is smaller than that of the LDP notion; d) Utilities
of the models with latent variables are higher than those
without because the collected data becomes less sensitive.
When the correlation between X and G is weak, for some
s, X can be directly published to achieve 0 MSE.
7 CONCLUSION
In this paper, the notion of local information privacy is
proposed. As a context-aware privacy notion, it provides a
relaxed privacy guarantee than LDP by introducing prior
knowledge in the privacy definition while achieving in-
creased utility. Combined with an MMSE estimator which
also leverages prior knowledge, enhanced gains in utility
can be obtained. We implement the proposed LIP notion
into data aggregation framework and derive the utility
privacy tradeoff, which is to minimize the MSE between
the function of the collected data and the estimation, while
protecting the privacy of the raw data or a private latent
variable that is arbitrarily correlated with the collected data.
We then theoretically compare the proposed LIP framework
with those satisfying LDP definition. Finally, we use both
synthetic and real-world data to show that, the proposed
LIP framework provides better utility than LDP, especially
when the prior information is more skewed and when the
domain size is large.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 1
Proof. When -LIP is satisfied, the privacy metric of DI can
be expressed as:
Pr(Y = y|X = x)Pr(X = x)
Pr(Y = y|X = x′)Pr(X = x′)
≤ Pr(Y = y)Pr(X = x)e

Pr(Y = y)Pr(X = x′)e−
≤ e2+DX∞ .
For the other direction, when -DI holds, we have:
Pr(Y = y|X = x)
Pr(Y = y|X = x′) ≤ e
+DX∞ .
Then we have:
Pr(Y = y) =
∑
x∈D
Pr(Y = y|X = x)Pr(X = x)
≤
∑
x∈D
e+D
X
∞Pr(Y = y|X = x′)Pr(X = x)
≤e+D∞Pr(Y = y|X = x′).
Similarly, Pr(Y = y) ≥ e−−DX∞Pr(Y = y|X = x′). Thus
(+DX∞)-LIP is satisfied.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
Proof. The MMSE estimator Sˆ can be expressed as:
E[S|Y¯ ] = E[f(X¯)|Y¯ ] = E[f(X1, X2, ..., XN )|Y¯ ]
(a)
=E[f1(X1)|Y¯ ] + E[f2(X2)|Y¯ ], ...,+E[fN (XN )|Y¯ ]}
(b)
=
N∑
i=1
E[fi(Xi)|Yi],
(40)
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where (a) in Eq. (40) is due to the independence of Xis,
and (b) is because Xi is only correlated with Yi in the output
sequence. Thus, E(S, Sˆ) can be derived as:
E(S, Sˆ) = E
( N∑
i=1
{fi(Xi)− E[fi(Xi)|Yi]}
)2 . (41)
Note that, for the application of histogram, the error
forms an error vector of (Sk, Sˆk)dk=1. By the definition of
second order norm. The mean square error of this case is:
E(Sk, Sˆk)dk=1 =
d∑
k=1
E
( N∑
i=1
{fki (Xi)− E[fki (Xi)|Yi]}
)2 ,
where fki (Xi) = 1{Xi=k}.
We next show that in general, the total MSE can be
decomposed into the summation of local MSEs (the proof
of histogram is shown in Appendix. F).
E(S, Sˆ) = E
( N∑
i=1
{fi(Xi)− E[fi(Xi)|Yi]}
)2
=
N∑
i=1
E [fi(Xi)− E[fi(Xi)|Yi]]2
− 2
N∑
j=1,l 6=j
E{(fj(Xj)− E[fj(Xj)|Yj ])(fl(Xl)− E[fl(Xl)|Yl])}.
The cross terms are 0 because ∀j, l ∈ {1, ..., N} and j 6= l:
E{(fj(Xj)− E[fj(Xj)|Yj ])(fl(Xl)− E[fl(Xl)|Yl])}]
=E[(fj(Xj)− E[fj(Xj)|Yj ])]E[(fl(Xl)− E[fl(Xl)|Yl])]
=[E(fj(Xj))− E{E[fj(Xj)|Yj ]}][E(fl(Xl))− E{E[fl(Xl)|Yl]}],
where E(fj(Xj)) − E{E[fj(Xj)|Yj ]} and E(fl(Xl)) −
E{E[fl(Xl)|Yl]} are 0, because the estimator is unbiased.
Thus, E(S, Sˆ) = ∑Ni=1 Ei(qi).
We next show that the global optimal solutions (pertur-
bation parameters) satisfy each local privacy constraint:
Assume that for each user, the minimized Ei(qi) = ei is
achieved at qi∗ ∈ Ti, then E(q1∗, ...,qN∗) =
∑N
i=1 ei.
If for some user “k” who takes parameters qk ∈ Tk, by
assumption, we know that Ek(qk) ≥ ek. Thus,
k∑
i=1
Ei(qi∗) + Ek(qk) +
N∑
i=k+1
Ei(qi∗) ≥
N∑
i=1
ei.
That means the minimal value of E(q1, ...,qN ), where qi ∈
Ti, ∀i ∈ [1, N ] can be achieved if for each user, qi = qi∗.
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF THEOREM 2
Proof. Notice that Var[Xi] is a non-negative constant, thus
minimizing MSE is equivalent to maximize Var[Xˆi].
Step 1. Regardless of the privacy constraints:
Minimized solution:
Consider a set of parameters: qimin, when q
i
nk = λ
i
k,
∀n, k ∈ 1, 2, 3...d, Var[Xˆi] = 0. Since Var[Xˆi] ≥ 0, thus the
solution of qink = λ
i
k results in a minimal value of Var[Xˆi].
Maximized solution: Consider a set of parameters:
qimax, assume that for all k = 1, 2...d, q
i
kk = 1 and q
i
kl = 0
for all l 6= k. Under this solution, λik = P ik and
d∑
m=1
d∑
n=1
d∑
k=1
amanP
i
mP
i
nq
i
mk
(
qink
λik
− 1
)
=
d∑
n=1
a2nP
i
n(1− P in)−
d∑
n=1
d∑
m 6=n
anamP
i
nP
i
m = Var[Xi].
(42)
Notice that Ei ≥ 0, Var[Xi] ≥ Var[Xˆi]. Thus, the solution
of qikk = 1 and q
i
kl = 0, ∀k = 1, 2, ..., d, l 6= k results in the
maximum value of Var(Xˆi).
Next, investigate the monotocity of the region between
minimum and maximum:
Taking derivative with respect to qilk, becomes
∂Var[Xˆi]
∂qilk
=
1
(λik)
2
alλik
(
2
d∑
m=1
(amq
i
mk − ajλik)
)
− P il
(
d∑
m=1
amq
i
mk
)2
=
alq
i
lk
(∑d
m 6=l amq
i
mk
)
(1− P ik)(qilk − λik)
λik
.
(43)
From Eq. (43), we can observe that the station point of qilk
is λik, which we know is the minimal value and Var[Xˆi] is
monotonically increasing when qilk > λ
i
k; Var[Xˆi] is mono-
tonically decreasing when qilk < λ
i
k. As a result, without
considering the privacy constraints, the optimal solutions of
each qimn is either 0 or 1. We next show that the maximum
value of Var[Xˆi] can only be achieved by the solutions
discussed above.
Now, assume that for the data value l, there is a subset
of index S s.t: qilk 6= 1 6= 0, for any k ∈ S . Denote Xˆ as the
estimator using qimax and Xˆ
′ as the estimator using qimax
but the parameters for data value l are substituted according
to the subset. Regardless of the constraints, compare with
the variance of Var[Xˆi] and Var[Xˆ ′i], we have:
Var[Xˆi]− Var[Xˆ ′i]
=
n∑
k=1
a2lP
i
l (
P il
P il + P
i
k
) +
n∑
k=1
a2kP
i
k(
P ik
P il + P
i
k
)
+
d∑
m/∈{1,2,...,n}
alP
i
l amP
i
m − 2
n∑
k=1
alak
P il P
i
k
P il + P
i
k
=
n∑
k=1
(alP
i
l − akP ik)2
P il + P
i
k
+
d∑
m/∈{1,2,...,n}
alP
i
l amP
i
m > 0.
(44)
Thus, the form of the optimal solution is unique: for any
k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, only one of the qikjs is one, other qikjs are
all zeros.
Step 2. With privacy constraints:
As Var[Xˆi] is monotonically increasing when qilk > λ
i
k;
and monotonically decreasing when qilk < λ
i
k. The optimal
solution (with privacy constraints) lies on the boundaries
of the constraints: e− = λ
i
k
qijk
, or λ
i
k
qijk
= e (under 0 ≤ qijk;∑d
n=1 q
i
jn = 1;, ∀j, k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d).
When one of the probabilities of qim1, q
i
m2, ..., q
i
md, ap-
proaches 1 and others approaches 0, there are d possible
selections, and consider all the m ∈ {1, 2, ..., d} there
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are d! feasible solutions. We now consider the case where
qikks approach 1 for all k ∈ 1, 2, ..., d, and other qikjs are
approaching 0. For the qikks which approach 1, the upper
bounds is valid, and for qikjs which approach 0, the lower
bounds are valid. Considering the privacy constraints, we
know the upper bound of qikk is λ
i
k/e
− and the lower
bound of qikj is λ
i
k/e
. As qikk +
∑d
j=1,j 6=k q
i
kj = 1, for all js
qikjs are approaching boundaries simultaneously, as a result,
they may not reach the boundaries at the same time.
Next, discuss whether lower bounds or upper bounds
are reached first. When lower bounds are reached, qijk =
λk
e
for all j, k ∈ 1, 2, 3, ..., d, j 6= k. Thus qikk = 1− (1− P ik)/e,
λik = P
i
k.
We can check whether qikks are in the feasible region:
λik
qikk
− e− = e
P ik
e + P ik − 1
− e− ≥ 0, (45)
e − λ
i
k
qikk
=e − e
P ik
e + P ik − 1
≥ 0. (46)
So, when qikjs reach the lower bound, q
i
kk is still in the
feasible region, it is readily to check that when qikk reaches
the upper bound, qikjs do not satisfy the privacy constraints.
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 3
Proof. As the MSE is the difference between the variance
of the raw data and the variance of the estimator, when d is
fixed, the variance of the raw data is fixed, it is equivalent to
show when f 6= d, the variance of the estimator decreases.
We know the optimal solution of the parameters of any
input Xi = ak are in the form of: qikk is approaching to
1 while other qikjs are approaching to 0 so that each input
value can be inferred by a particular output. For example,
given Yi = ak, one can probably infer that Xi is also ak and
the confidence increases with .
• Assume that f < d, when the d is fixed, Var(X)
is also fixed. denote Var(Xˆi) as the variance of the
estimator with d = f and Var(Xˆ ′i) as the variance of
the estimator with d > f . Recall that
Xˆi =
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
ajPr(Xi = aj |Yi = ak)1ik, (47)
Xˆ ′i =
d∑
j=1
f∑
k=1
ajPr(Xi = aj |Yi = ak)1ik, (48)
First assume that for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, k ∈
{1, 2, ..., f}, the parameters of Xˆi and Xˆ ′i are iden-
tical. We know that for each j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}, k ∈
{1, 2, ..., f}, ajPr(Xi = aj |Yi = ak) ≥ 0, thus
Var(Xˆ ′i) is monotonically increasing with f .
Notice that the parameters of Xˆi and Xˆ ′i can not be
identical as for at least one j, qikj will increase for
k ∈ {f + 1, f + 2, ..., d}, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., f}. However,
this will make each Pr(Xi = ak|Yi = aj) smaller,
thus Pr(Xi = ak|Yi = aj) > Pr(X ′i = ak|Y ′i = aj).
As a result: Var(Xi) > Var(X ′i).
• Assume that d < f , this case can be viewed as
a special case of the general model with P id+1 =
P id+2 = ... = P
i
f = 0. Thus the optimal solutions is
straightforward: qikk = 1− (1− P ik)/e, qikj = P ij/e
for k, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}; qikj = 0, for k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d},
j ∈ {d + 1, d + 2, ..., f}. As a result, the optimal
solution is equivalent to the case of the general model
with d = f .
In summary, the optimal range of output is f = d.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 3
Proof. The first step is to show the minimal MSE is achieved
when q0 and q1 are at their minimum, which can be proved
by taking derivative of the MSE function with respect to qs
to show that MSE is increasing with qs.
The second step is to find the minimum values of qs,
which are found according to the privacy constraints. To
derive the monotocity of the privacy metric with respect to
qs. Define F i1 =
Pr(Gi=g|Yi=1)
Pr(Gi=g)
, F i2 =
Pr(Gi=g|Yi=0)
Pr(Gi=g)
which
can be further expressed as
F i1 =
Pr(Yi = 0|Gi = g)
Pr(Yi = 0)
=
(1− qi0)T ig0 + qi1T ig1
qi1P
i
1 + (1− qi0)(1− P i1)
;
F i2 =
Pr(Yi = 1|Gi = g)
Pr(Yi = 1)
=
qi0T
i
g0 + (1− qi1)T ig1
(1− qi1)P i1 + qi0(1− P i1)
.
(49)
Taking derivative over qi0 and q
i
1, we have:
∂F i1
∂qi0
=
(T ig1−P i1)qi1
(qi1P
i
1+(1−qi0)(1−P i1))2 ,
∂F i1
∂qi1
=
(T ig1−P i1)(1−qi0)
(qi1P
i
1+(1−qi0)(1−P i1))2 ,
∂F i2
∂qi0
=
(P i1−T ig1)(1−qi1)
(1−qi1)P i1+qi0(1−P i1)2 ,
∂F i2
∂qi1
=
(P i1−T ig1)qi0
(1−qi1)P i1+qi0(1−P i1)2 .
So we know, when T ig1 > P
i
1 , F
i
1 is monotonically
increasing with qi, whereas F i2 is monotonically decreasing
with qi, so the minimum qis are achieved when F i1 = e
−
and F i2 = e
. Solving the equations, and we get: qi0 =
T ig1−P i1e
(e+1)(T ig1−P i1) ; q
i
1 =
1+T ig1e
−e−P i1
(e+1)(T ig1−P i1) ; When T
i
g1 < P1, F
i
1 is
monotonically decreasing with qi, whereas F i2 is monoton-
ically increasing with qi, so the minimum qis are achieved
when F i1 = e
 and F i2 = e
−. Solving the equation, and we
get: qi0 =
P i1−T ig1e
(e+1)(P i1−T ig1) ; q
i
1 =
1+P i1e
−e−T ig1
(e+1)(P i1−T ig1) .
The final step is to test the value of qi0 and q
i
1 as functions
of T ig1, taking derivative on q
is, we have the first set of
solutions are monotonically increasing with T ig1, and the
second set of solutions are monotonically decreasing with
T ig1. Thus to find a pair of q
i
0 and q
i
1 satisfy the T
i
g1 for all
g ∈ G, we take the maximum of all the possible values, and
as qis are non-negative, thus another candidate in the max
function is 0.
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APPENDIX F
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1
Proof. For the utility function of the problem of histogram
estimation, the parameter-related term can be expressed as:
N∑
i=1
d∑
m=1
{
Var
(
d∑
k=1
Pr(Xi = am|Yi = ak)1{Yi=ak}
)}
=
N∑
i=1
d∑
m=1
d∑
k=1
Pr(Xi = am|Yi = ak)2Var(1{Yi=ak})
+
N∑
i=1
d∑
m=1
d∑
l6=k
Pr(Xi = am|Yi = ak)Pr(Xi = am|Yi = al)
· Cov(1{Yi=ak} · 1{Yi=al})
=
N∑
i=1
d∑
m=1

 d∑
k=1
(qimkP
i
m)
2
λik
(1− λik)−
d∑
k=1
d∑
l6=k
qimkq
i
ml(P
i
m)
2

=
N∑
i=1
d∑
m=1
{
(P im)
2
d∑
k=1
(qimk)
2
λik
− 1
}
.
(50)
For the i-th user, taking partial derivative of Eq. (50) with
respect to qimk, ∀m 6= k ∈ {1, 2, ..., d}:
(
∑d
l 6=m q
i
lk)
2(1− P im)(qimk − λik)
λik
, (51)
where similar conclusion can be drawn as in the proof of
Theorem 2: minimum is achieved when qimk = λ
i
k; the
function is monotonically decreasing when qimk < λ
i
k and
increasing when qimk ≥ λik. Thus, the optimal solutions are
found at the boundary of the privacy constraints. As the
optimization problem defined in Eq. (28) is identical to that
of Eq. (20), they also have the same optimal solutions.
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